Finland's War of Choice: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II

The story of Finland's war against the Soviet Union at the side of Nazi Germany from 1941-1944 is one of contradictions and complicated narratives intertwined. Indeed the contradictory memoirs themselves present such a tangled mess of half-truths and outright deceit within the history of the war that they may never be completely straightened out. Complicating an already complicated situation such as this is very uneasiness of Finnish historians attempting to come to grips with the unpalatable fact of cooperation with one of the most repulsive regimes in modern history. As such, attempting to untangle any of this narrative is a supremely challenging undertaking and in itself demands a degree of respect. It has simply not been attempted by a writer in English since the war's end. Attempting to do all of this while also presenting analysis of that narrative is nearly an unbelievable feat.

Retired US Army Col. Henrik O. Lunde's narrative Finland's War of Choice is an excellent and worthy first attempt in the English language. Lunde himself describes the historiographical focus of the book as primarily addressing "the unique problems that arose from an ill-prepared coalition between a democracy and a dictatorship" (3). Secondly, this work is an effort at analysis of the military operations and what decisions led to them. This is investigated both `in theater' and contextually within "the international political arena" as well (5). This is accomplished with varying degrees of success throughout the book.

Lunde is most successful in the straightforward telling of the military operations both on the strategic and tactical level. Although he comments in the introduction that the narrative will frequently deviate from a normal chronological approach, for the most part his retelling does not. Indeed, this is partly why the narrative is so effective. It is quite frankly very smooth and well crafted: a great read. This is by no means to say that what is contained within this book is lightweight. Detail is rarely omitted for the sake of `readability' (whatever that means) and descriptions of combat frequently are covered at the battalion level. Where Lunde does occasionally deviate from a strict chronological approach is in telling the story of the three primary regional efforts of the Finnish/German forces to affect some significant result. Each is covered separately particularly during the initial period of war.

Among the most gripping portions of the book is chapter four which describes the numerous attempts to cut the Murmansk rail line from central Finland and thus cut off the city of Murmansk itself. The next chapter, describing the primarily Finnish offensives in Ladoga Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus are equally enthralling, particularly as it will likely be the first time many readers have ever seen descriptions of the offensives in print. This well crafted narrative actually continues throughout the book after the first chapter and draws in the reader repeatedly. Indeed, at times readers will likely find themselves gritting teeth and nearly shouting at the book for the strategic idiocy demonstrated by both Finnish and German planners in 1941 and 42. Repeatedly Lunde describes the division of effort between numerous objectives along the rail line and failure to identify an area of primary effort.

Somewhat less consistently successful is the author's attempt at analysis. This can be explained to a certain extent by the fact that this is only his second published work. When compared to the giants of the field of World War II history such as Col David Glantz or perhaps holocaust historians Peter Longerich and Christopher Browning this work is revealed as a much lesser work. Typically, the analysis is somewhat superficial and frequently rather brief. Although this is disappointing by and author who's claimed secondary goal was analysis it is certainly not a crucial flaw, merely a mildly frustrating one at times. This is particularly the case with the epilogue. Although he raises some interesting points regarding the nature of the German-Finnish coalition he never really goes much below the surface. A pleasant exception to this was the author's investigation of the failure of the offensives in central Finland to cut the Murmansk rail line, which are quite intriguing and thought provoking.

Least successful for Col Lunde is his effort in telling the story of the initial diplomatic moves which eventually led to the coalition. Frequently the author resorts to assumptions and suppositions in the first chapter. Within one particular section of two pages he can be counted as writing "may have", "assumed" (twice), "unlikely", and "probably" (38-39). This is incredibly passive and poor writing and thankfully disappears for the most part after the initial chapter. It is unfortunate that the author did not benefit from a stronger editor. This weakness also leads on a few occasions to Lunde giving his opinion in the first person which is a huge no-no which would also been avoided with a better editor.

Lastly on the negative side of the ledger are a couple of minor irritations: the somewhat weak selection of primary sources and the shortage of quality maps throughout. As far as the primary sources go, it is unfortunate that the author's admitted lack of fluency in Finnish and outright inability to read Russian so affected his use of contemporary source materials. Really that is what research assistants are for, so the excuse is really not acceptable. The map issue is unfortunate but in general the detail of the narrative is strong enough to follow the story without additional maps.

In conclusion, although certain flaws certainly exist Lunde has done a creditable job in writing the first real history of the Finnish and German coalition against the Soviet Union. The prose is top notch and the narrative is truly engaging at times. Although the analysis is frequently superficial and the editing could certainly have been better, this is overall a very good effort at telling the story of the very strange union between Nazi Germany and democratic Finland. Through Lunde's exceptional efforts this confusing and contradictory story has been made significantly less confusing as well as highly intriguing. This is a solid four-star book marred only by the need for deeper analysis and better editing. These minor flaws are all that separate it from a fifth.

This is a valuable book that is most frustrating. It studies how the Germans viewed Finland during their Continuation War (a term avoided by Lunde). It might be more accurately titled something like "Germany's Blind Alley--How Finland used Germany to accomplish its limited war aims".

While the book covers Finland, Germany, and Soviet Union from 1941-1944, it relies primarily on German sources. The German-centric nature of the information and viewpoint (which can be seen even in the front cover photo, which is of German troops, while the back cover photo is of Finnish troops) results from Lunde's linguistic limitations: "My own difficulty in reading Finnish has served as a limitation on the use of Finnish sources. ... My use of Russian sources has basically been limited to works that have been translated to English." (p. 5) It is a great loss that Lunde didn't have Finnish and Russian co-authors/researchers to assist him in utilizing Finnish and Russian sources, and one wonders how he ever thought he could answer the ongoing questions regarding the mysteries that make up why Finland worked with Germany, what Finland agreed to do, when the decisions were made, and who made them. All Lunde can say is that they remain mysteries because the Finns have worked hard to cover any tracks and he can't pierce the linguistic veil. And one is completely in the dark about Soviet activity. His two chapters on the 1944 Soviet offensive have next to no Soviet sources!

This work ends up relying on and replacing both German General Waldemar Erfurth's Der Finnishe Krieg 1941-1944 (1950) and The Last Finnish War (1979) as well as Earl Ziemke's The German Northern Theatre of Operations 1940-1945 (1959). It does the same, though to a lesser extent for Olli Vehvilainen's Finland in the Second World War. Between Germany and Russia (2002). If you own Lunde's work, you really don't need Erfurth's or Ziemke's, as Lunde's chapter endnotes show heavy use from nearly first to last page of these sources.

This book is let down by a lack of maps and by the lack of detail in the maps that are provided. There are far too many cases, esp. during the 1944 Soviet offensive, where the maps fail to do justice to the text and the reader is at a loss as to the location of events. There is no justification for such a failure. This is yet another book let down by poor maps!

Lunde writes his book mainly from a HQ and higher perspective. Unlike writers on the earlier Winter War, he doesn't do justice to the fighting on the ground or the conditions the front-line troops faced. One is mainly reading about command decisions, strategic political-military analysis, and the movements & actions of army corps, divisions and regiments. I never really had the sense of feeling like I was experiencing the war as it was fought by soldiers on either side. And Lunde is honest that his focus is on army activity. Naval and air activity get very little emphasis.

Lunde does a great job explaining how Germany was led down the blind alley by Finland, wasting troops and resources on a theatre of war that ended up being entirely unproductive because the Germans failed to set concrete military plans and goals with Finland and failed to use whatever leverage they had in 1941 to get the Finns to do what they needed. As Lunde states, "The Germans, on the other hand, reaped virtually no benefits from the coalition after the Finns recovered their lost territories and conquered East Karelia. The Finns refused to help the Germans against Leningrad and effectively did the same with respect to interdicting the Murmansk Railroad. The end result was that the Germans were left to dance to the Finnish fiddler. ... For Germany, Finland was a blind alley." (p. 381)

I was disappointed in his limited discussion of the static period, from the summer of 1942-summer of 1944. His 8th chapter, "Front Without Combat Activity--January 1943-June 1944", is just 29 pages. This was the critical time for political, military, and economic decisions to be made, esp. as regards what to do about ending the War vis-a-vis the Soviets, but Lunde glosses over this period. However, Lunde does a great job pointing out Mannerheim's failure to use this time to prepare for the eventual Soviet onslaught. Mannerheim failed in this critical time to properly equip and position his forces and fortify the necessary areas. As Lunde points out, Mannerheim foolishly thought the Soviets wouldn't attack Finland and he allowed his troops to be positioned for political purposes (i.e., use East Karelia as a bargaining chip), failing to recognize that the eventual Soviet steamroller would go right back up the all-important Leningrad to Viipuri Isthmus as they did in 1940 and the Finns did in 1941! Mannerheim's failure almost cost Finland its post-war independence, for if the Soviets had advanced just a bit farther a bit sooner, Finland's heartland would've been opened up for Soviet tanks that couldn't then be stopped.

Yet with all of the limitations, this is still most valuable for English readers wanting to learn more about Finland, Germany, and the Soviets from 1941-1944. It is the only readily available recent work on the Continuation War in English. The reader will have a decent idea of the overall ebb and flow of events and why Finland did many of the things she did (e.g., her fear that being too aggressive against the Soviets would cause the USA to declare war against her and lead the UK to more actively pursue its own declared war against them).

Without a doubt this effort covers a neglected area of World War Two. To its credit it attempts to lay bare the decisions made by Finland's civil and military leadership as it fended off the Soviets, aligned with the Nazis, and eventually settled back down at the close of the war satisfied but defensive (and perhaps not comfortable) with where it ended up. My biggest issue with the history is it's sterility. Absent are any narratives from those who experienced the conflict so it comes across as bland and clinical. The result is it affirms much of what has was already known but missed the opportunity for real "truth and reconciliation".

Finland was the only democratic nation that threw in with the Nazis and though this was perhaps "the least harmful choice among bad alternatives", the author does not explore the human aspect of these critical decisions. We do get a sense that this coalition between democracy and dictatorship was one of mutual convenience but the personal Finnish element is woefully missing. And the author adds, "It is much more difficult to discern the true Finnish was aims or what the Finns expected from their participation in the war" - which is the crux of the whole book. Further it is pointed out that "It is rather amazing that the Finns appear not to have realized - by their refusal to participate in operations against the Soviet Union after they had secured the lost territories and East Karelia - that the achievement of their own goals was totally dependent on Germany achieving its goal of destroying the Soviet Union."

This history does capture the size and scope of the conflict (amazing that the country put 500,000 men in uniform out of a population of 4 million - and they are fantastic winter warriors) and the order of battle is clear and concise. Yet the book ends abruptly with a missed opportunity in providing how Finns today view their wartime history.

Well researched historical explanation of why Finland wanted Hitler's help to recover the territory lost in the 1939/40
Winter War to the Soviet Union and --

1) the misjudgments of Finland about advancing beyond the old borders lost to Russia and,
2) how and why Finland (Marshal Mannerheim!) avoided Soviet occupation after the Armistice in 1944.

After 50 years of study of the War, I learned a great deal of NEW information about the diplomatic back-and-forth
between Finland and Molotov.

After the conclusion of the Winter War (1939-40) Finland felt betrayed by the empty promises of the Western
Democracies (i.e. Churchill) and others, to assist Finland to resist the Soviet Union.

When German "Barbarossa" began in '41, Finland sought a partner to revenge and to restore the barbarous theft of 10% of
Finland's best farmland by Russia.

Mannerheim, thankfully!, was able to play Finland's dire straits in '44 perfectly by secret negotiations with the US --
and, in effect saved Finland from occupation of the country, as had happened to Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia.

PS I was there! The attitude toward the Wehrmacht in 1941-42 Finland was mixed, Germans were admired for their discipline and
Barbarossa successes but always chuckled at for their "Zu Befehl" compliance to orders, however counterproductive.
Wehrmacht was out of its depth in winter fighting, essentially in snow and swamps! My Uncle Ben started out in '41 as a young
sub-Lieutenant soon after the Winter War with an idealization of Germany; but he, too, began to see the buttons falling off
Hitler's coat before Stalingrad. Finland's 'Peace Objective' was national survival! The advance beyond Finland's pre-1940 borders was perhaps inappropriate but politically important. In any case it provided a bargaining chip for an Armistice in
1944 with Stalin (with the refusal of Finland to invest Leningrad!) that helped keep Finland sovereign!) -- Unlike the Baltic States!
Mannerheim gets much too little credit for his diplomacy and realism -- he always was a noble Englishman, never a Nazi!

"FINLAND'S WAR OF CHOICE: The Troubled German-Finnish Coalition in World War II", by author Henrik Lunde deals with what the Finns call the "Continuation War", their war against the Soviet Union at the side of the Germans from 1941-1944, as well as the Finns' expulsion of those German troops from their country in 1944-1945.

In late 1940, the Soviet Union demanded Finland give up certain territories and bases in return for Soviet land elsewhere. As it was a bad deal, the Finns refused, and in November 1940, the Soviets attacked Finland in what became known as the "Winter War". After (surprisingly) inflicting severe defeats on the Soviets for several months, the Finnish defenses were slowly being crushed under the sheer weight of the Soviet Army, and Finland had to accept Soviet peace terms. Although the Finns had to ceded around 10 percent of its territory and 30% of its economic assets to the Soviet Union, they retained their sovereignty.

The book describes how, after the Winter War, Finland was in a very rough spot. The Allies had not intervened in the Winter War, and the Soviets appeared to want a second war to subdue Finland in its entirety. As a result of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact between the Germans and the Soviets, the Germans, to whom the Finns had looked toward for help, were nominally allied with the Soviets and offered no assistance during the Winter War. However, German-Soviet relations were slowly souring, and Germany began planning a surprise attack on the Soviets. Finland could either stand aside, and perhaps be devoured by the Soviets, or ally with the Germans against the Soviets. As the book details, the Finns bet on the Germans.

As discussed by the author, the relationship between the Germans and Finns was not a true alliance, and was more in the line of "co-belligerents". The Germans, probably because they thought that they could knock the Soviets out of the war only a few months, did not have a coherent plan for the Finnish Front, nor did they and the Finns come to agreement on specific objectives before the Germans invaded the Soviet Union. As the war progressed and deteriorated (from the German/Finnish points of view), the divergence in each country's goals and concerns led to the Germans basically wasting a strong Army in Finland, remaining in place and doing little or nothing for most of the war.

Had the Germans been able to get the Finns to agree to certain key objectives, Leningrad probably would have fallen in 1941, and the Murmansk railroad could have been cut in 1941 or 1942. The Germans could also have economically blackmailed Finland into doing more, but chose not to do so. As it was, while the Finns destroyed and tied down a number of Soviet troops, the net effect of the Finnish theater probably cost the Germans a lot more than it gained them.

The book does a good job of describing the politics, goals of both the Germans and Finns, the duplicities (mostly on the Finnish side, though usually for good reasons), and combat in the theatre. The book is written primarily from the Finnish and German points-of-views, which works given that the book is about the Finnish/German coalition.

The Finns called it the Continuation War for several reasons, mostly so they could try to convince themselves and the outside world that they were not being the aggressors. While I've read several accounts of the Winter War, this is the first book I've read that has gone into such depth on the Continuation War, and I learned a lot of interesting facts. For example, Finland had a population of only 4 million, but during 1941, had mobilized over 500,000 men serving into its armed forces ... literally one out of every 8 Finnish citizens. This number was not sustainable over the course of the war, and contributed to large problems in the Finnish economy.

I do have a few nits. First, while there are maps provided, there aren't quite enough, in my opinion, and some of them are somewhat poor quality. Second, the author typically uses the Russian names rather than Finnish ones for territories ceded to the Soviet Union. As I'm a bit of an amateur historian and am somewhat familiar with the place names during that period, it was a bit confusing. Petsamo, for example, became Pechenga. It would be like writing a book on the Battle of Stalingrad and calling that city by its current name "Volgograd" throughout the book. Both of these nits are just that ... only nits, and do not seriously detract from the book.

This book is one of only a bare handful in English that deals with the "Continuation War" and its aftermaths. While, as the author notes, he's not fluent in Finnish (or Russian) and had to rely to some extent on works translated into English, I felt that he did a fine job of laying out and analyzing the collaboration between Finland and Germany, and it's aftermaths. If you're looking to learn more about a little known theatre of World War II, get this book.

This book covers a great deal of WWII history that is virtually unknown to most English-only readers. About time, as several of the battles covered in this book are among the most extreme in the history of warfare.

What Lunde does best is to give English-only readers a detailed description of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1941-44, in Finland and Sweden mostly called the Continuation War, meaning a continuation of the Winter War. Lunde argues against using the Finnish term Continuation War. He has a point there. But was it instead a Finnish war of choice? Actually, Lunde delivers three arguments for renaming his book.

First, Lunde writes about the aftermath of the Winter War, that it left Finland with a "monumental problem" of having to move about half a million Finnish citizens to other parts of Finland. The country at the time had a population of a mere 3,7 million. I agree with Lunde but believe that even more important was the pressure from Finnish society to make it possible for the very large refugee part of the Finnish population to return to their home towns and villages.

Secondly, the ceded territories were of great military significance to Finland. The peninsula of Hanko was by itself, to use Marshal Mannerheim's words (quoted by Lunde), "a pistol aimed at the heart of the country and its most important communications".

Thirdly, as Lunde writes:

"There are no doubts that the Soviets followed a policy that made Finland fear for its safety. This short-sighted policy helped propel isolated Finland into the arms of Germany. For example, at the time of the Moscow Peace in March 1940, Finland approached Sweden and Norway about a defensive alliance. Things looked promising until the Soviet Union vetoed the idea. Such an alliance may [might?] have worked to the great advantage of the Soviets by causing the Germans to have second thoughts about their planned attack on Denmark and Norway."

Lunde adds that a second attempt at a Nordic alliance, consisting of just Finland and Sweden, was also stopped by the Soviet Union, in October 1940. Slightly concealed under this great "what if" lies another one. What if the Germans in 1941 could have attacked the Soviet Union also with those troops that were stationed in the Nordic countries?

In spite of my argument against the book's title - basically I believe it was only partly a war of choice - and other aspects, I consider this book a real must for English-only readers interested of Nordic WWII history. A longer version of this review can be found on my blog.

This book covers an aspect of Finnish history that is seldom objectivly written about in Finland and almost completly unknown outside of the Nordic countries.
The book is very detailed and written with the clarity of mind of a military man. This is a double edged sword as his descriptions of battles and engagements can be lengthy, going into the minutia of every movement and counter attack, which for the non-military buff can be slightly tedious. Also the lack of sufficiently detailed maps in the text makes it hard to follow battle sequences. However the positive aspect of his military background is that he brings a clarity of analysis to the reasons for success or failure that cuts through the dross that normally afflicts such texts. His analysis at the end of each chapter is second to none and helps explain a lot about the war. In fact you could do worse than read his analysis at the end of each chapter first and then read the battle details in that chapter afterwards.
I for one could never understand why the Finns stopped their advance in Soviet Karelia when they did. I had heard various scenarios usually centering around the fact that the Finns behaved honourably in only seeking to reclaim the territory they lost as a result of the Winter War. According to Col. Lund it was the entirely believable fact that the Finns feared US retribution if they cut the Murmansk rail line and they had also lost faith in German invincibility by that time. In effect they rather inglouriously "hedged their bets".
The fact that Col. Lund does not speak Russian or Finnish has been a limiting factor in his analysis. I am sure he has an opinion as to why Marshall Mannerheim was never tried by the Soviets for war crimes when it is considered that they went after just about everybody else at wars end. He does offer us tantalising insights into Mannerheim's thinking but he has had to rely on secondry sources which given the partisan analysis of the Continuation War will never give us an accurate picture.
All in all a great addition to the limited English resources on the wars in Finland between 1939 and 1945. A thoroughly researched book, if slightly limited owing to language issues. If you are a military history buff then this is a 5 star book for you. if like me you prefer analysis and consequences skim through the battle details and read the conclusions at the end of each chapter.

I have done some research on what happened to Finland when the Russians invaded them in '39. Finland had really kicked the Russian's butts for the 4 months that the shooting happened, but were forced to end the war due to lack of manpower and supplies, and their army suffering over 50 percent casualties when the Russians could easily afford to lose millions into a war that Finland couldn't afford.

But I knew little about Finland rising back in 1941 to get their revenge on the Russians and their lands back, this time with a prepared army of 300,000 men and allied with Germany only for that purpose of getting what was stolen from them. This book goes into major detail on those years! But by 1944, the friendship between Finland and Germany was at great strain and to avoid a complete Russian takeover, the Finns were forced by October of that year to turn against their former allies. This book is awesome and completely deserves 5 stars!

This is an excellent book on a little know part of the Eastern Front. This part of the war on the Eastern Front is generally covered by a few pages at most. It is well written and gave me a good understanding of what the opposing forces were facing. The maps were very helpful in following the narrative. I liked enough that I bought a copy for of friend of mine.

received with packaging very damaged, but I was able to clean up the cover (smeared with some black substance) and book looks just used now. Can't wait to read it.