A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949
A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949 book cover

A Force So Swift: Mao, Truman, and the Birth of Modern China, 1949

Hardcover – September 19, 2017

Price
$15.69
Format
Hardcover
Pages
400
Publisher
Crown
Publication Date
ISBN-13
978-0307887238
Dimensions
6.5 x 1.5 x 9.5 inches
Weight
1.44 pounds

Description

New York Times Book Review Editors' Choice • Winner of the 2018 Truman Book Award “Peraino’s absorbing study of the pivotal year in Chinese-American relations — when Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party came to power — shows how decisions made then have continued to affect relations between the two countries up to the present day.”xa0– The New York Times Book Review "The intimate, blow-by-blow reconstruction of the story offers a vivid sense of what it must have been like for American policy makers as they grappled...with the rapidly deteriorating situation in China....Capture[s] a critical moment in the founding of what is today the most important bilateral relationship in the world." - The Wall Street Journal “A stellar history ... [that] belongs on the shelf of anyone interested in China and Taiwan.” -The National Interest "China is likely to be the most significant force in the global life of the 21st century, a prospect that makes Kevin Peraino's lucid and compelling new book all the more relevant. By reconstructing the Truman reaction to the fall of Nationalist China and the rise of Mao, Peraino takes us back to the beginning of the journey. This book is excellent history that informs the headlines of today." -Jonxa0Meacham, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Destiny and Power "Kevin Peraino has written a compelling narrative about the dramatic events of 1949, when Mao's armies defeated Chiang Kai-shek and Truman had to decide what to do about it. In this well-researched and well-crafted book, he tells us about Mao's calculations and about the arguments in Washington--events that would determine U.S. policy in Asiaxa0for the next thirty years." -Frances FitzGerald, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Fire in the Lake "Just now, when Americans are again trying to make sense of China, a new look at the postwar roots of U.S.-Chinese relations could not be more timely.xa0 And axa0rivetingxa0look this is, filled with charismatic individuals, dramatic moments and fraught decisions that still shape our world today." -H.W. Brands, author of The General vs. the President "As China looms ever larger as America's global rival, it is hard to remember--or even imagine--a time when America was said to have "lost" China. The time was 1949, and Kevin Peraino takes us there with vividness and immediacy, a sure hand and a clear eye. This is narrative history at its most compelling." -Evan Thomas, author of Being Nixon " Nineteen forty-nine was a transformative year in world affairs, and Kevinxa0Peraino splendidly captures its significance and the larger-than-life personalitiesxa0that made things happen. An important book, and a great read." -George C. Herring, author of The American Century and Beyond KEVIN PERAINO is a veteran foreign correspondent who has reported from around the world. A senior writer and bureau chief at Newsweek for a decade, he was a finalist for the Livingston Award for foreign reporting and part of a team that won the National Magazine Award in 2004. He is the author of Lincoln in the World: The Making of a Statesman and The Dawn of American Power . Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved. ***This excerpt is from an advance uncorrected copy proof*** Copyright © 2017 Kevin Peraino PROLOGUE October 1, 1949, Beijing Bodies jostled, elbow to elbow, angling all morning for a spot in the square. Soldiers clomped in the cold—tanned, singing as they marched, steel helmets and bayonets under the October sun. Tanks moved in columns two by two; then howitzers, teams of ponies, gunners shouldering mortars and bazookas. On the flagstones, in front of the imperial gate, men and women craned their necks toward a platform above a portrait of Mao Zedong, painted in hues of blue, hanging beside tubes of blue neon. Underneath, a sprinkling of yellow streamers rippled in the crowd. Nearly everything else in the frenzied square was red. Shortly after three p.m., a tall figure in a dark woolen suit stepped up to a bank of microphones atop the gate. He lifted a sheet of folded paper, pursed his lips, and glanced down at a column of Chinese characters. A double chin rested against his collar; heavy jowls had long since submerged his cheekbones. Although Mao was still only in his mid-fifties, he was not in good health. He rarely went to bed before dawn. For years he had punished his body with a masochistic regimen of stewed pork, tobacco, and barbiturates. Occasionally, overcome by a spell of dizziness, he would suddenly stagger—one symptom of the circulatory condition that his doctors called angioneurosis. Still, he had retained into middle age what one acquaintance described as “a kind of solid elemental vitality”—a kinetic magnetism that photographs could never quite manage to convey. On this day, Mao’s speech, delivered in his piping Hunanese, was nothing particularly memorable: a few lines praising the heroes of the revolution and damning the British and American imperialists and their stooges. But the celebration that followed, marking the birth of the People’s Republic of China, was a cathartic spectacle. Mao pressed a button, the signal to raise the flag—yellow stars against a field of crimson—and a band broke into “March of the Volunteers,” the new national anthem, with its surging chorus of “Arise, arise, arise!” An artillery battery erupted in salute; a formation of fighter jets slashed across the sky. The sun set, and the party went on: fireworks raced toward their peaks, rockets of white flame—then fell, smoldering but harmless, into crowds of giddy children. Red gossamer banners billowed in the evening breeze, undulating like enormous jellyfish; to one witness, the British poet William Empson, they possessed a kind of “weird intimate emotive effect.” Lines of paraders hoisted torches topped with flaming rags; others carried lanterns crafted from red paper—some shaped like stars, some like cubes, lit from within by candles or bicycle lamps. Slowly, singing, the glowing procession bled out into the city. Among the marchers was a boy of sixteen, Chen Yong. He held a small red flickering cube. He had been twelve years old when he joined Mao’s army, though he had looked even younger—a year or two, at least. He had studied Morse code, one of the few jobs for a boy his age, then joined a unit that fought its way through Manchuria. As the long civil war was coming to a close, Chen’s father had thrown his boy back in school. But on this night no one was studying. The war was over; Mao had won. Chen carried his lantern into the dark. Nearly seven decades after this celebratory light show, I visited Chen Yong at his home in Beijing, an unfussy apartment block in one of the city’s western neighborhoods. Chen was now in his early eighties; his hair had gone white, and a gauzy beard descended from his chin. In his hand, trembling slightly, he clutched a pair of eyeglasses. One inflamed eyelid was nearly closed; a furtive intensity had replaced the calm flat gaze of his teenage years. One of my favorite parts of researching this book—a yearlong chronicle of the Truman Administration’s response to Mao’s victory in 1949—was the opportunity to spend time with some of the remaining eyewitnesses to the pivotal events of those dramatic twelve months. There are fewer and fewer survivors left; some of the key figures have been dead for four decades and more. The rest are elderly, their memories fading fast. In telling this story I have generally clung to the contemporary documents—the diaries, memoranda, letters, and news- paper reports that yield the most accurate portrait of that year. Still, I never passed up the opportunity to talk with those who were actually there. There was something magical about these encounters—a living connection to a bygone China. In the summer humidity of his apartment, Chen shuffled slowly across the concrete floor, opened a drawer in his bedside table, and pulled out a black and white photo. In the picture, his younger self wore the padded gray tunic of a Chinese Communist soldier—cinched hopefully at the waist, a size or two big for his teenage frame. As we talked, the emotion of that year seemed as present as it might have been seventy years ago; at one point he quietly began to sing one of his old marching songs. Yet when I pressed him on the granular details of his experiences, he was often at a loss. He would narrow his eyes, looking straight at me, and say with frustration, “It’s hard to remember.” Still, when I asked him how often he thought back to the events of that year, he said, “Pretty much all the time.” And that, of course, is the great paradox of growing old: the less we can remember, the more time we spend remembering. As with people, so with nations: even as the survivors of the revolution are disappearing, Chinese leaders are spending more time trying to recall that era. China’s current president, Xi Jinping, said shortly after he took power that he considered revolutionary history the “best nutrient” for a nation making its ascent as a great power. After years of de-Maoification in the 1980s, China’s leadership now consciously seeks to reprise some of Mao’s best-known political themes. When modern Chinese statesmen look to the past, they gravitate not to the lunacy of the Great Leap Forward, Mao’s reckless attempt to transform China’s agricultural economy, nor to the depredations of the Cultural Revolution, the fevered campaign to solidify Mao’s rule in the late 1960s and early 1970s by mobilizing China’s disaffected youth. Rather, today’s Chinese leaders celebrate the triumphs of 1949, with all their emotional reverberations. Among other tributes, Xi’s government recently inaugurated a new holiday, called Martyrs’ Day, to be held each September 30 —the date in 1949 that Chinese leaders broke ground on a major national monument in Beijing. The China of today remains filled with mementos of 1949. On a recent spring morning, I took a day trip from Beijing to Xibaipo, one of the rural base camps that Mao had occupied at the beginning of the year, as his armies prepared to complete their conquest of the mainland. Once a bone-jarring voyage across pitted roads, today it is a painless four-hour drive along superhighways flanked by thick hanging trees. Although the weather in Beijing had been unusually sunny and smog- free, the sky grew hazier as we traveled southwest, into China’s industrial heartland. Out the windows, flashes of the new China whizzed by: sand pits, smokestacks, solar panels, power lines, chewed hills that looked as if they had been eaten by a cosmic-scale monster. And yet in other ways, an older China was with us still. On the dashboard of his Ford sedan, my taxi driver had placed a slick white bust of Mao that said, on its pedestal, safe and sound. In Xibaipo, now a stark but bustling tourist town, we passed a restaurant called Red Memory and an information center selling trinkets emblazoned with portraits of Mao and Xi Jinping. Farther in, we arrived at a complex of low-slung, dun-colored bungalows marked with placards written in Chinese and Russian. Wandering beside the pear and locust trees, visitors paid five yuan to sit in a replica of Mao’s can- vas folding chair; for a little more, twenty yuan, they could pose for a photo behind an embankment of sandbags, wearing an old army uniform and hoisting a rifle. The site, according to a member of the staff, had actually been moved slightly from its original location, to make way for a reservoir. But nobody seemed to mind. On this morning the museum was crowded with tourists filing past glass cases filled with relics of the revolution. Yet there is another, darker side to this sort of remembrance. Mao’s victory in 1949 provoked a reaction across the Pacific; by the end of the year, the United States had extended its policy of containing Communism, once limited primarily to Europe, to Asia as well. The Truman Administration crafted an ambitious plan—including a series of covert operations—to bolster the nations along China’s periphery. Even as Mao consolidated his control over the mainland, American opera- tors quietly slipped cash and weapons to his enemies. These historical events, too, inform Chinese views about the present, as the nation continues its fitful rise. Anxious Chinese officials see today’s American policy as a sequel to the containment strategy hatched in 1949. They fret over American troop deployments and training missions to East Asia, and they suspiciously eye flashpoints like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan for evidence of modern American perfidy. That narrative of 1949—a combination of triumph mixed with grievance—overlooks a great deal. In reality, American policy makers battled fiercely with one another as they struggled to shape a response to Mao’s victory. Some wanted to engage him; others wanted to con- front him; still others wanted to ignore him completely. In between existed a thousand shades of nuance. These disputes were not simply tactical differences of opinion; they reflected profound disagreements about the nature of the American relationship with China and revealed fault lines in the American character itself. They destroyed careers, reduced a cabinet member to tears, and in the decades that followed gave rise to some of America’s most divisive foreign wars, in Korea and Vietnam. The most disconcerting thing is that these fissures—though now largely hidden—still exist. Each approach is fueled by its own self- deceptions, its own brand of remembering and forgetting. There is no obvious antidote to all this historical make-believe. It is not a matter of simply setting out the facts; the stories we tell our- selves about China are too freighted with emotion to be chased away so easily. Still, by slipping into the participants’ skins and looking at the dilemmas of 1949 through their eyes, we can begin to share some of their fears and thrills—and ultimately purge some of our own anxieties and misconceptions. In other words, the only cure for a runaway story is another story. This one begins aboard an airplane, with a glamorous woman pre- paring for a fight. Read more

Features & Highlights

  • New York Times Book Review
  • Editors' Choice
  • • Winner of the 2018 Truman Book Award
  • A gripping narrative of the Truman Administration's response to the fall of Nationalist China and the triumph of Mao Zedong's Communist forces in 1949--an extraordinary political revolution that continues to shape East Asian politics to this day.
  • In the opening months of 1949, U.S. President Harry S. Truman found himself faced with a looming diplomatic catastrophe--"perhaps the greatest that this country has ever suffered," as the journalist Walter Lippmann put it. Throughout the spring and summer, Mao Zedong's Communist armies fanned out across mainland China, annihilating the rival troops of America's one-time ally Chiang Kai-shek and taking control of Beijing, Shanghai, and other major cities. As Truman and his aides--including his shrewd, ruthless secretary of state, Dean Acheson--scrambled to formulate a response, they were forced to contend not only with Mao, but also with unrelenting political enemies at home. Over the course of this tumultuous year, Mao would fashion a new revolutionary government in Beijing, laying the foundation for the creation of modern China, while Chiang Kai-shek would flee to the island sanctuary of Taiwan. These events transformed American foreign policy--leading, ultimately, to decades of friction with Communist China, a long-standing U.S. commitment to Taiwan, and the subsequent wars in Korea and Vietnam.   Drawing on Chinese and Russian sources, as well as recently declassified CIA documents, Kevin Peraino tells the story of this remarkable year through the eyes of the key players, including Mao Zedong, President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, Minnesota congressman Walter Judd, and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the influential first lady of the Republic of China. Today, the legacy of 1949 is more relevant than ever to the relationships between China, the United States, and the rest of the world, as Beijing asserts its claims in the South China Sea and tensions endure between Taiwan and the mainland.

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Most Helpful Reviews

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Mao's Triumph or Truman's and the Worlds Tragedy?

Author could have researched more thoroughly, particularly among Rep. Walter H. Judd papers as he was less than accurate in Judy's role and motives. I knew Judd well. Also he all but ignored the roles of the anti-Chiang and pro-Mao
State department and others influencing our government against Chiang Kai-shek. No development of the "commies are just agrarian reformers" campaign. The author does a disservice to history and what happened to China. It was a watershed for China, but the author neglected to indicate how great a positive change could have come if we hadn't let down our WWII ally. Among some positive developments almost surely been no Viet Man war. No North Korea. No communizing of Cambodia. No Chinese attempt to control huge casts of sea areas. Taiwan development and prosperity could have been mainland China's decades earlier without the cultural revolution, etc, which were the true gifts of Mao and Truman to the world.
47 people found this helpful
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Tour De Force on Revolutionary China and US policy in 1949

Kevin Peraino’s newest book, A Force So Swift is an extremely well researched work into the China’s Maoist Revolution in 1949 and how Truman and the U.S. reacted to it. With Mao and his communist ideology on one side and Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalists on the other, there were numerous competing influences both for and against a stronger U.S. reaction or even military involvement. Peraino outlines not only the geopolitical realities such as the growing influence of the Soviet Union, Korea – North and South, the French in Vietnam, and the overall concern about stopping the spread of communism. He also brings the background and personality of the key players into his work. Mao, Chiang, Madam Chiang, Truman, Stalin, Acheson as the main players on this world stage as well as many secondary players. He does a remarkable job demonstrating the difference between the seemingly unstoppable political and revolutionary forces and those that could have been altered had there been different players in their respective power roles. Exceedingly well covered was the large question of which of the two competing powers would be recognized by the U.S. and England.

Having enjoyed his prior book, Lincoln in the World, I personally found A Force So Swift to have been more academically additive on its topic, perhaps as a result of my greater knowledge of Lincoln vs. China. With that said, with either book, any reader will come away with a greater understanding of its topic and having enjoyed the read. I can only begin to understand the work that goes into producing something of this scale but already am looking forward to his next project. Pick up a copy and enjoy Peraino’s work.
17 people found this helpful
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Great book, readable by general public, and specialized enough for scholars.

My wife and I bought this book based on the NY Times review. We both learned a lot from it.

The narrative is arranged chronologically through 1949, as Mao's forces took control of the mainland and Chiang Kai-Shek fled to Taiwan. Peraino's descriptions of the internal policy disputes in the US government were brilliant--Acheson at State vs. Johnson at Defense, vs. Judd in Congress. We learned more about the "infamous" State Department "White Paper" (apparently 1,000 pages long, hardly a "paper"), and the NSC's end-of-the-year policy paper on China, where Truman formally stated that the U.S. had no intention of invading China to overthrow Mao. The conflicting accusations about "losing" China vs. aiding Chiang's corrupt regime are clear. Mao's dilemmas also pointed to the fractures of governing a country emerging from 15 years of war,and his struggles to pursue Stalin's support.

When I was a boy, all I knew about China was that it was "Communist," and that Communist China was a severe "loss" to the United States. The fact of Mao's nationalism, and the growing nationalism in South East Asia, was lost on me and my family. (My uncle did tell me, however, that the U.S. had been backed into subsidizing a "two-bit dictator" in Chiang on Taiwan.) I did not know any Chinese people, did not know anyone who spoke Chinese, and did not study Asia in Social Studies classes. I had learned nothing about China's demography or geography. I did learn about Mao's "Great Leap Forward" and its fall-on-the-face results, and about the Chinese intervention in the Korean War, both from incidental reading. I am still intimidated by China's "power" and the complexity of its language(s). I sometimes wish I had learned Chinese calligraphy in my early school years, when I might have been able to master something so complex.

In all, we found Peraino's book very helpful and informative. My only wish was that he had explained better the (emerging?) virulent anti-Communism and McCarthyism developing in the Congress, replete with half-truths and bold-face lies and character smears. 1949 increased the fears inside the U.S. of virulent communist infection and helped solidify the domino theory that led to Viet Nam, so including McCarthyism in the narrative would have been warranted.
2 people found this helpful
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Who Lost China?

Occasionally people ask me why I read so much non-fiction. The answer is quite simply, that there is so much that I don’t know, and there is even more that I don’t know that I don’t know. This book falls into the latter category. I consider myself reasonably well-versed on history, especially of the 20th century--- and yet I found myself having “aha moments” throughout this book.

=== The Good Stuff ===

* The Peoples Republic of China didn’t just show up one day. It was created over a period of years, and after great struggle between a popular revolutionary movement and a somewhat hated existing government. Along the way, the nations of the world, particularly the US, had to come to grips with having little or no influence over the emergence of a new Chinese government. Concurrently, the schism between the US and USSR was in full swing, and the world-wide conspiracy of communist government to overthrow democracies was driving US foreign policy. In short, the conditions were set for a major conflict between the US and Stalin’s new ally, Mao Zedong.

* Kevin Peraino does an excellent job of putting the US/China relationship into the context of the times. US internal politics, the personalities of those involved, fears and paranoia of citizens and leaders of the world, changing technologies all affected how the US viewed China. Further the actions of Chaing Kai Shek and his wife were designed to influence US policy, and they were not above lobbying Congress and Cabinet Officials. Peraino pulls the whole story together and gives it some organization and clarity.

* The book helps to explain some of the later history of Asia. For example, China has historically tried to surround itself with friendly governments to enhance its own security. As Beijing sought to install friendly governments in Korea and Vietnam, the stage was set for further conflict with the US. As a second example, the Nationalist Chinese were very effective at identifying themselves in the US mindset as the former allies of WWII, leading to a long delay in the US recognizing the Peoples Republic.

* It was very interesting to see the strategic visions of various US leaders, especially President Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson. To briefly summarize, the feeling was that China would likely not remain “communist” for long, and that Mao’s policies would eventually be swept away. As we watch China industrialize and become a leader in world commerce, you can’t help but wonder if it is too early to settle this argument- and if the Peoples Republic does not already have a “capitalist” system. One description of Mao’s reign was it served as a “forest fire”, which prepared the ground of China for a burst of new growth.

=== The Not-So-Good Stuff ===

* It is almost impossible to write a detailed book on a subject such as this without it getting a bit dry. For the most part, Periano keeps the book lively and moving at a rapid pace, and writes in a clear and easy-to-read style. However, as Truman fights yet another political battle with selected Congressmen, it does get a bit repetitive.

* You can almost feel Periano struggling with how much of an omniscient narrator he wants to be. Obviously, it is easy to look back from 2017 and pass judgement on the decisions and opinions expressed in 1950, but to understand the history it is necessary to judge these in the context of the times. For the most part, the author avoids being too judgmental, but it is certainly tempting.

=== Summary ===

The book describes a series of events which, I believe, many historically literate Americans are ignorant of. And yet as China continues to grow in strength and influence, many of their actions suddenly become clearer understand the historical context. China’s obsession with owning small rocky outcroppings in the ocean makes more sense when you picture Mao nursing his new-born country through its first weeks…with an American naval force and troop carriers parked off his shoreline.

I gained a lot of insight from the book, and it helps put many of the seeming paradoxes of modern China into a better perspective. The book stops short of getting into the later disasters of Mao’s rule, and t would be nice to see a follow-up volume on those times. But the book improved my knowledge of reent Chinese history, and I found its material as important to understanding China as the history of the American Revolution is to understanding the US.

=== Disclaimer===

I was able to read an advance copy through the courtesy of the publisher and NetGalley.
2 people found this helpful
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What might have been

The most talented writers of history have the ability to make dead people come alive. Kevin Peraino is one of those writers. He has chosen 1949 as a pivotal year in establishing the tenuous relationship between the US and China which would result in the Korean and Vietnam wars as well as China's present position as our economic rival. President Truman, Chairman Mao, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek become fascinating players in the drama which preceded the Soviet Union's explosion of its first atomic bomb in August. The reader is left to ponder how today's headlines might have differed if Truman had adopted a more conciliatory stance toward Mao before Communist paranoia had gripped Washington.
1 people found this helpful
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Very readable history of a crucial time

China is viewed today as a political and financial threat to the United States. How that came to be, after China had been an ally of the United States, is documented in this book. Peraino takes readers through the aftermath of World War II with the conflict between Mao and Chiang and the American attitude towards it.

Even though Madam Chiang had come to Washington D.C. to press the case for her husband, she could not convince Truman to support the Nationalist government in China. Mao rose in power, eventually forcing Chiang to retreat to Taiwan. Mao decided to align himself with the Soviets and the future of China was cast.

I was surprised at the White Paper Acheson crafted and Truman approved. It placed all the blame on Chiang's leadership. Even though the U.S. had waited and watched and then neglected to be involved in China's civil war, it was not to blame for the fall of the country to communist rule, the document declared. There were some who disagreed, such as Congressmen Judd and Lodge. They attempted to fund financial aid to help keep communists from taking over Southeast Asia. Though the amendment was defeated, “the initiative had set in motion a series of events that would profoundly alter American life – a first step into the morass of Southeast Asia's wars.” (189)

I recommend this book to readers who would like to understand the changes that took place in Asia after World War II and in particular the events of 1949.

I received a complimentary copy of this book from the publisher. My comments are an independent and honest review.
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reads like a novel

Kevin Peraino spotlights a brief, pivotal time in the history of the U.S., the consequences of which are just now fully playing out. Well researched and detailed account of the interactions of Mao, Stalin and Truman. Even more interesting are the divisive politics in this country revealed during this period. Well written, reads like a novel. Highly recommended.
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Informative and an excellent read

Born and raised in the far east, this book was an interesting and powerful read! As English isn't my first language, I found it to be slightly challenging to go through the pages without looking up words. However, it's all worth it. The author's story telling ability is impressive. It also provided me with an entirely different perspective on the past that was written quite differently into our history textbooks. The author makes reading about the past history an incredibly fun journey and a rich learning experience.
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Three Stars

Disappointed, rehash of multiple other books on the late forties in China.
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Clear and Compelling

Post World War Two feels like it should be familiar to most people however the sequence of political issues often isn’t. Peraino describe the events that lead to the China we know today or at least its roots. So many people were sick of conflict and the GI’s and their families wanted to get on with rebuilding their interrupted lives. Truman and his cabinet and the then current Congress didn’t have this luxury.

Peraino concentrates on China and Chang Kai-Shek’s nationalist party versus mao’s Communist platform. Obviously the US had a vested interest in aiding Chang. The Soviet Union backed the Communists. I’m impressed with clarity of how the facts are presented. There were lots of players but the author alternates each party’s concerns and the reasoning behind their actions.
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